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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

WHY REINVENT THE WHEEL?—PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN
THE WAKE OF THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE MELTDOWN
WITHOUT THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU

INTRODUCTION
The United States has arguably entered into the recovery period of what
has become known as the Great Recession.1 This Great Recession, the worst
economic crisis faced in the United States since the Great Depression,
witnessed the near collapse of the financial sector of the United States, a rapid
decline in home values, and large increases in mortgage delinquencies and
foreclosures.2 While the exact causes of the crisis remain a topic of much
debate, a rapid increase in the number of subprime mortgages offered by
various financial institutions, coupled with the crash of the United States.
housing market in late 2006 to early 2007 caused much of the chaos
surrounding the Great Recession.3
Subprime mortgages are mortgages offered to less creditworthy borrowers
at higher interest rates than traditional loans.4 The number of subprime
mortgages increased because of an influx of foreign cash into the United
States, mostly from Asia and the Middle East, and extremely low rates of
interest promulgated by the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States (Federal
Reserve).5 These factors drove down interest rates and caused banks to
aggressively compete to attract borrowers.6 As a result, credit was “cheap and

1. Mark Lieberman, Leading Economists Declare End to Recession, FOXBUSINESS.COM
(Oct. 12, 2009), http://www.foxbusiness.com/story/markets/economy/leading-economistsdeclare-end-recession/; Catherine Rampell, ‘Great Recession’: A Brief Etymology, N.Y. TIMES
BLOG (Mar. 11, 2009 5:39 P.M.), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/greatrecession-a-brief-etymology/.
2. KATALINA M.BIANCO, CCH, THE SUBPRIME LENDING CRISIS: CAUSES AND EFFECT OF
THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 2 (2008); Press Release, IHS Cambridge Energy Research Assocs.,
Inc., Three Top Economists Agree 2009 Worst Financial Crisis Since Great Depression; Risks
Increase if Right Steps are Not Taken (Feb. 13, 2009), http://www.cera.com/aspx/cda/
public1/news/pressReleases/pressReleaseDetails.aspx?CID=10119.
3. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at
Morehouse College: Four Questions About the Financial Crisis (Apr. 14, 2009) (transcript
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090414a.htm).
4. Dana Dratch, Want a ‘Subprime’ Loan?: What to Watch Out for When Borrowing
Money, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 12, 2005, at C2.
5. BIANCO, supra note 2, at 4; Bernanke, supra note 3.
6. Bernanke, supra note 3.
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easy [for households] to obtain,” driving a housing boom throughout much of
the country.7 Unfortunately, much of this cheap credit was extended in a
reckless manner.8 Lending institutions acted carelessly because they believed
home prices would continue to rise indefinitely and credit would remain cheap
and easily accessible, allowing borrowers to refinance their homes if
necessary.9 These beliefs turned out to be false, but many lenders did not
discover this fact until it was too late, and a crisis was triggered in the United
States.10
The fallacy in this reasoning became apparent in early 2007 when housing
prices began falling, and subprime borrowers could not keep up the payments
on their mortgages.11 Mortgage delinquencies skyrocketed, which only
intensified the downturn in home prices.12 Lenders, handicapped with severe
losses and facing the possibility of insolvency, greatly reduced lending, which
effectively froze the credit markets.13
In order to loosen the credit markets and prevent the collapse of these
financial institutions, the federal government passed the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008.14 This act provided funds to the Secretary of the
Treasury “to immediately provide authority and facilities . . . to restore
liquidity and stability to the financial system of the United States.”15
Additionally, the federal government attempted to reenergize the economy and
encourage job creation through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 2009.16 As a result of these actions, many believe the recession has ended
and the long, slow road toward recovery has begun.17 This development
allowed the federal government to shift the focus of its efforts. Instead of
working to stimulate the economy and prop up the financial sector, Congress

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Bernanke, supra note 3.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765
(2008) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201–5261).
15. Id. § 2(1), 122 Stat. at 3766.
16. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115
(2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). This economic stimulus bill was
in addition to the Economic Stimulus Act passed one year earlier, which provided economic
stimulus checks to individuals. Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-185, § 101, 122
Stat. 613 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
17. See Lieberman, supra note 1. The propriety and effectiveness of these economic
stimulus acts have been much debated; however, those issues are beyond the scope of this
Comment.
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and the Obama Administration began to look at what caused this crisis and
consider proposals to prevent similar collapses in the future.18
President Barack Obama signed one such proposal, the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), into law on
July 21, 2010.19 The goal of the Dodd-Frank Act is “To promote the financial
stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in
the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer
by ending bailouts, [and] to protect consumers from abusive financial services
practices . . . .”20
To achieve this goal, the Dodd-Frank Act prohibits deceptive, unfair, and
abusive practices in transactions involving consumer financial products or
services.21 Additionally, the Dodd-Frank Act creates the Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection (BCFP) as “an independent bureau to . . . regulate the
offering and provision of consumer financial products or services under the
Federal consumer financial laws.”22 Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the current
financial regulatory system will be significantly overhauled.23 The regulatory
authority of the government agencies that currently regulate consumer lending
will transfer to the BCFP.24 The BCFP is given the power to “implement[] the
Federal consumer financial laws through rules, orders, guidance,
interpretations, statements of policy, examinations, and enforcement actions.”25
Additionally, the BCFP will have power to commence civil actions for
violations of the Dodd-Frank Act and eighteen other federal statutes.26
The purpose of this comment is to explore the necessity of the new federal
bureau to protect consumers from lenders. Specifically looking at the Truthin-Lending Act (TILA), the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
(HOEPA) amendments to TILA, and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act (RESPA), this comment examines whether the BCFP is necessary, or if
subprime borrowers, armed with modified versions of our current federal laws
and perhaps a new consumer protection law, could adequately protect
18. See Press Release, Dep’t of the Treas., TG-189, ¶ 96-168, Administration’s Regulatory
Reform Agenda Moves Forward: Legislation for Strengthening Consumer Protection Delivered to
Capital Hill (June 30, 2009), http://prod.resource.cch.com/resource/scion/document/default/%
28%40%40BANK-ISSUE+NOTICE96-168%2909013e2c85801693?cfu=Legal.
19. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act];
Kevin G. Hall, Obama Signs Historic Financial Overhaul Bill, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July
22, 2010, at A9.
20. Dodd-Frank Act pmbl, 124 Stat. at 1376.
21. Id. § 1031(a), 124 Stat. at 2005.
22. Id. § 1011(a), 124 Stat. at 1964.
23. See id. §§ 1061–1067, 124 Stat. at 2035–56.
24. See id. § 1061(b), 124 Stat. at 2036.
25. Dodd-Frank Act § 1012(a)(10), 124 Stat. at 1965.
26. Id. §§ 1002(12), (14), 1054(a), 124 Stat. at 1957, 2028.
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themselves through private litigation. Part I of this comment will provide a
brief background of subprime lending and the United States housing bubble, as
well as how these developments led to the near collapse of the United States
financial system. Part II will examine the BCFP as it will exist under the
Dodd-Frank Act, specifically focusing on the litigation authority delegated to
the BCFP. Part III explores the consequences the BCFP will likely have on the
availability and cost of consumer credit. Part IV will explain the provisions of
TILA, including the HOEPA amendments and RESPA, exploring their
requirements and the remedies they provide for subprime borrowers who are
misled by their lenders. Finally, Part V contains an evaluation of the BCFP
and offers constructive alternatives for achieving consumer protection and
financial stability without this new governmental bureau.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUBPRIME LENDING
AND THE HOUSING BUBBLE
This section provides a brief overview of the historical background that led
to the financial crisis, including the rise of subprime mortgages and the
bursting of the United States housing bubble. A housing bubble is an
economic bubble that occurs in real estate markets.27 A real estate bubble is
characterized by rapidly-rising real estate values to unsustainable levels.28
Subsequently, prices fall, leaving mortgage debt in excess of property values.29
In the past two decades, the United States has been the recipient of a great
deal of foreign savings, which flooded into our financial institutions and
provided large amounts of capital used for making loans.30 Former Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan argues this foreign investment was the
driving factor behind decreasing interest rates and increasing housing prices.31
However, in the wake of the dot-com bust and economic recession in 2001, the
Federal Reserve cut the federal funds rates from 6.5% to 1%.32 Richard W.
Fisher, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas, admit the Federal Reserve’s interest policy during the early 2000s was
“misguided.”33 Mr. Fisher acknowledges the Federal Reserve’s policy
increased liquidity and speculation in the housing market, thus contributing to
the housing bubble.34

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

BIANCO, supra note 2, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Bernanke, supra note 3.
BIANCO, supra note 2, at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
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Flush with cash and facing stiff competition, financial institutions began to
aggressively lend to customers.35 This competition, combined with low
interest rates, made consumer credit cheap and easily obtained.36
Consequently, mortgage lending greatly increased, further fueling the housing
boom.37 In the decade between 1994 and 2004, home ownership increased
from 64% to a record-level 69.2%.38 This increased demand drove an
incredible 124% increase in home values between 1997 and 2006.39 Kenneth
Rogoff, professor of economics and public policy at Harvard University,
explained that “At the heart of what happened [during the housing boom] is
that we lost perspective on what was real and what was really [illusion] fueled
by . . . low interest rates, [and an] influx of money” into the United States from
emerging markets.40
Unfortunately, according to Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke,
“[M]uch of this lending was poorly done, involving . . . little or no down
payment by the borrower or insufficient consideration by the lender of the
borrower’s ability to make the monthly payments.”41 This poor lending came
in the form of subprime mortgages.42 As previously mentioned, subprime
mortgages are loans made to borrowers with poor credit or other flaws, which
prevent the borrowers from obtaining traditional loans.43 The amount of
subprime mortgages grew from $35 billion in 1995 to $807 billion in 2005.44
In 1996, subprime mortgages made up 9% of the loans originated in the United
States; however, by 2006, subprime mortgages accounted for 20% of the home
loans made in the United States.45
As the prevalence of subprime mortgages grew, the standards to qualify for
even a subprime mortgage fell, allowing more people into the market.46
Lenders became careless because they made two assumptions: 1) They thought
home prices would keep rising, allowing borrowers to build equity; and 2)

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Bernanke, supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
BIANCO, supra note 2, at 6.
Id.
Press Release, IHS Cambridge Energy Research Assocs., Inc., supra note 2.
Bernanke, supra note 3.
See BIANCO, supra note 2, at 6.
Bernanke, supra note 3; Dale Ledbetter, Understanding the Sub-prime Debacle, in
PRACTISING LAW INST., CORPORATE LAW & PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK, SER. NO. 1633 35,
39 (2007).
44. David Schmudde, Responding to the Subprime Mess: The New Regulatory Landscape 15
(Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper Series, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1333798. This computes to an increase in subprime lending of greater than 3500%.
45. BIANCO, supra note 2, at 6.
46. Schmudde, supra note 44, at 25.
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They believed credit would remain readily accessible, enabling borrowers to
refinance if the mortgage became too burdensome.47
Subprime mortgages carry significantly higher interest rates and fees than
traditional mortgages, with interest rates sometimes reaching 10% to 11%,
with fees exceeding $10,000.48 Additionally, before the crisis, many subprime
loans were extended for 100% of the value of the property; 80% of subprime
loans carry adjustable rates.49 Most subprime mortgages were extended
without so much as confirming the borrower’s income, and many borrowers
who obtained subprime mortgages had credit scores of less than 580.50
Furthermore, many subprime borrowers were qualified for loans using low
introductory rates, which soon escalated, resulting in monthly payments the
borrowers were unable to afford.51
While foreign cash and the decreasing interest rates drove a housing boom,
these factors also caused returns on “safe” investments such as United States
Treasury Bonds to fall.52 This forced investors, searching for increased
returns, toward more risky investments.53 In an effort to assist investors, the
financial industry created securities known as asset-backed or mortgagebacked securities, which combined many individual loans in complex ways.54
Asset-backed securities are securities:
[P]rimarily serviced by the cash flows of a discrete pool of receivables or other
financial assets, either fixed or revolving, that by their terms convert into cash
within a finite time period, plus any rights or other assets designed to assure
55
the servicing or timely distributions of proceeds to the security holders.

Mortgage-backed securities are asset-backed securities representing “claims to
the cash flows from pools of mortgage loans, most commonly on residential
property.”56 Mortgage-backed securities are created by purchasing mortgage
47. Bernanke, supra note 3.
48. Schmudde, supra note 44, at 15–16. However, from 2001 to 2007 the average difference
in interest rates between traditional mortgages and subprime mortgages fell from two and eighttenths percentage points to one and three-tenths percentage points. This decrease reflects a
decline in the “risk premium” lenders required for taking on subprime borrowers. BIANCO, supra
note 2, at 6–7.
49. Preserving the American Dream: Predatory Lending Practices and Home Foreclosures:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 3 (2007)
(statement of Sen. Chris Dodd, Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs);
Schmudde, supra note 44, at 15.
50. Schmudde, supra note 44, at 15.
51. Id. at 18–19.
52. Bernanke, supra note 3.
53. Id.
54. See id. (describing new securities made by bundling individual loans).
55. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1101 (2009).
56. Mortgage-Backed Securities, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/
mortgagesecurities.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2011).
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loans from banks and mortgage companies, pooling those loans, and issuing
securities.57 This process, known as securitization, may be completed by
governmental and quasi-governmental entities, as well as by private
businesses.58 The Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae),
the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), and the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) issue most mortgage-backed
securities.59
Traditionally, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac provided liquidity to the
standard mortgage market.60 These government-sponsored entities would
purchase the loans from the originating lenders and issue securities using the
mortgages as collateral.61 After selling the initial loan to Fannie Mae or
Freddie Mac, the banks had cash that could be used to make a second loan.62
Investors purchased the securities, relying on guarantees of timely payments
provided by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.63 This system worked quite well
because the loans purchased were prime mortgages which met “well-defined
lending standards.”64 Because loan default rates were low, investors came to
see mortgage-backed securities as safe investments.65
In a quest for increased return on investment, however, “creative
investment bankers began to develop more complex, sophisticated securities
backed by mortgages.”66 Financial firms began to include adjustable-rate
subprime mortgages in pools with prime mortgages, without properly
disclosing the source of the subprime loans or that very little due diligence was
completed to determine their quality.67 Mortgage originators believed “Wall
Street” would accept any product, and they obliged by making and selling
more subprime mortgages.68 Therefore, despite the belief that these mortgagebacked securities were safe, they proved to contain significant risks that neither
the financial institutions that created them nor the investors who purchased
them foresaw.69

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Ledbetter, supra note 43, at 39.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.; Mortgage Backed Securities, supra note 56.
64. Schmudde, supra note 44, at 32.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 33. For a brief overview of the development of complex mortgage-backed
securities, see id. at 33 n.92.
67. Ledbetter, supra note 43, at 43.
68. Id. at 41–43.
69. Bernanke, supra note 3.
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In early 2007, it became apparent that the two assumptions upon which
bankers handed out loans with reckless abandon were not well founded.70 The
credit boom began to fall apart when housing prices started dropping and
subprime borrowers were unable to stay current on their mortgage payments.71
As a result of this phenomenon, mortgage delinquencies and defaults rose,
exacerbating the fall in home values.72 Investors were spooked and began
pulling back from the credit markets while lenders, facing incredible mortgage
losses, dramatically cut back their lending.73 This, in turn, led to the demise of
several major financial firms and froze the credit markets.74
II. THE BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION: STRUCTURE AND
FUNCTION
In the wake of this crisis United States House Representative for
Massachusetts, Barney Frank, introduced House Resolution 4173 on December
2, 2009.75 The resolution passed the House on December 11, 2009.76 On April
15, 2010, United States Senator for Connecticut, Christopher Dodd, introduced
his own financial reform bill, Senate Resolution 3217, known as the Restoring
American Financial Stability Act of 2010.77 Rather than passing Senate
Resolution 3217, the Senate instead passed an amended version of H.R. 4173
on May 20, 2010.78 Subsequently, a joint conference committee of
congressional negotiators reconciled the differences between the version of the
bill passed by the House in December of 2009 and the amended Senate
version.79 The conference report was filed with the House on June 29, 2010
and agreed to on June 30, 2010.80 The Senate agreed to the conference report
on July 15, 2010.81 President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Act into law as
Public Law Number 111-203 on July 21, 2010.82

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Bernanke, supra note 3, at 2–3.
75. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong.
(2009) (as introduced in House, Dec. 2, 2009).
76. 155 CONG. REC. H14,747–H14,804 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2009).
77. Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. Res. 3217, 111th Cong. § 1(a)
(2010) (as introduced in Senate, Apr. 15, 2010).
78. Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. Res. 3217, 111th Cong. § 1(a)
(2010) (as passed by Senate, May 20, 2010). See also 156 CONG. REC. S4027–S4078 (daily ed.
May 20, 2010).
79. H.R. REP. NO. 111-524 (2010).
80. Id.; 156 CONG. REC. H5212–H5222 (daily ed. June 30, 2010).
81. 156 CONG. REC. S5870–S5933 (daily ed. July 15, 2010).
82. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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The purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act is to promote financial stability,
reform the mortgage markets, protect consumers and investors, and prevent a
future financial meltdown.83 The law, which is over 2,000 pages in length,84 is
considered “the most sweeping overhaul of the financial system since the New
Deal.”85 The bill expands the grasp of federal banking and securities
regulation, subjecting a significantly larger cross-section of financial
companies as well as derivatives markets to regulation by the federal
government.86 The bill seeks to end the idea of “too big to fail,” by creating a
council of regulators with power to identify risks in the financial sector and
constrain or even dismantle troubled businesses without the use of taxpayer
funds.87 The “Volcker Rule,” another addition to the bill, “restricts the ability
of banks whose deposits are federally insured from trading for their own
benefit.”88 In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act creates the Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection to oversee financial products and services.89
The BCFP began with a proposal from the Obama Administration to create
a Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA) as a centerpiece of its
financial industry overhaul.90 In the House of Representatives, Representative
Frank first introduced the CFPA as House Resolution 3126 on July 8, 2009.91
Subsequently, House Resolution 3126 was folded in as Title IV of the Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009.92 Senator Dodd’s
original financial reform bill also contained the CFPA, but the final version of
Senator Dodd’s bill, which ultimately became the Dodd-Frank Wall Street

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Annalyn Censky, Obama on New Law: “No More Taxpayer Bailouts”, CNNMONEY.
COM (July 21, 2010, 12:46 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/07/21/news/economy/obama_signs_
wall_street_reform_bill/index.htm.
86. Financial Regulatory Reform, NYTIMES.COM (July 21, 2010), http://topics.nytimes.com/
topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit_crisis/financial_regulatory_reform/index.html.
87. Dodd-Frank Act § 111, 124 Stat. at 1392. See also Financial Regulatory Reform, supra,
note 86.
88. Dodd-Frank Act § 601, 124 Stat. at 1596. The “Volcker Rule” is named for former
Federal Reserve Chairman Paul A. Volcker, who introduced the rule in early 2010. Financial
Regulatory Reform, supra note 86.
89. Dodd-Frank Act § 1011(a), 124 Stat. at 1964.
90. Annemarie Schumacher, Bankers Wonder About Congress’ Regulation Plans, ST. LOUIS
BUS. J., Nov. 20, 2009, at 24.
91. 155 CONG. REC. H7836–H7837 (daily ed. July 8, 2009). See also H.R. 3126: Consumer
Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, NYTIMES.COM, http://politics.nytimes.com/congress/
bills/111/hr3126 (last visited Feb. 6, 2010).
92. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. §§
4001–4901 (2009) (as introduced in House Dec. 2, 2009).
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Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, replaced the CFPA with the
BCFP, an independent bureau housed within the Federal Reserve.93
President Obama, when introducing his version of the CFPA, stated the
purpose of the agency, proclaiming
This agency will have the power to set standards so that companies
compete by offering innovative products that consumers actually want—and
actually understand. Consumers will be provided information that is simple,
transparent, and accurate. You’ll be able to compare products and see what’s
best for you. The most unfair practices will be banned. Those ridiculous
contracts with pages of fine print that no one can figure out—those things will
94
be a thing of the past. And enforcement will be the rule, not the exception.

Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner also spoke out in favor of the CFPA,
stating
This agency will have only one mission—to protect consumers—and have
the authority and accountability to make sure that consumer-protection
regulations are written fairly and enforced vigorously. Consumer protection
will have an independent seat at the table in our financial regulatory system.
By consolidating accountability in one place, we will reduce gaps in federal
supervision and enforcement, drive greater clarity in the information
consumers receive around products they are sold, set higher standards for those
95
who sell those products and promote consistent regulation across the system.

In the Obama Administration’s version of the CFPA, the CFPA would
have had the power to prohibit certain consumer financial products or services
or certain features of those products, impose additional disclosure requirements
on consumer financial products or services providers, and require providers to
offer “plain vanilla” products the CFPA designed.96 Additionally, the Obama
Administration’s bill would have required lenders to make “reasonable

93. Compare Binyamin Appelbaum & Brady Dennis, Dodd Bill Would Redo Entire
Regulatory System, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2009, at A18, with Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111203 § 1011(a), 124 Stat. at 1964.
94. Press Release, Dep’t of the Treas., supra note 18.
95. Id.
96. David S. Evans & Joshua D. Wright, The Effect of the Consumer Financial Protection
Agency Act of 2009 on Consumer Credit 4 (Geo. Mason U. Law & Econ., Research Paper Ser.
No. 09-50, Jan. 7, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1483906. Thomas W. Hough
believes this position stems from a misunderstanding of the White House Proposal. Interview
with Thomas W. Hough, Chief Exec. Officer, Carrollton Bank, in St. Louis, Mo. (Jan. 25, 2010)
(on file with author). He does not believe banks would have been required to offer the “plain
vanilla” products. Id. Mr. Hough is also Chairman of the Illinois Bankers’ Association. IBA
Board of Directors, ILL. BANKERS ASS’N., http://www.ilbanker.com/leadership_board_
directors.asp (last visited Jan. 30, 2011). Carrollton Bank is a community bank established in
1877 in Carrollton, Illinois that currently has $790 million in assets. CARROLLTON BANK, THE
CARROLLTON BANK STORY 3–6 (2010), available at http://www.carrolltonbanking.com/pdfs/cb
Story.pdf.
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disclosures” and would have expressly allowed state and local governments to
impose additional restrictions on consumer financial products, beyond those
imposed by the federal government.97 This would have essentially made
federal regulation the regulatory floor and “end[ed] federal preemption of state
consumer protection for nationally chartered financial institutions.”98
The Treasury Department and the House Democrats, including
Representative Frank recognized some of these provisions were unlikely to be
approved by Congress.99 As a result, House Resolution 4173 modified several
of President Obama’s original provisions.100 These modifications, many of
which were carried through to the Dodd-Frank Act, resulted in President
Obama getting approximately 90% of the reforms he proposed.101 Despite
backing off some of President Obama’s more controversial proposals, the
Dodd-Frank Act is expected to have a significant impact on lending in this
country.102
One difference between the Obama Administration’s proposal and the final
financial reform bill regarded the CFPA. Rather than creating the CFPA as an
independent agency, the Dodd-Frank Act creates the BCFP as an independent
bureau housed within the Federal Reserve.103 The purpose of the BCFP is to
“regulate the offering and provision of consumer financial products or services
under the Federal consumer financial laws.”104 A Director, appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate, will head the BCFP.105
The Director will serve for five years and may only be removed prior to the
end of his term for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”106
During his term, the Director is barred from holding any position within “any
Federal reserve bank, Federal home loan bank, covered person, or service
provider.”107 The BCFP will have the responsibility to carry out the consumer
financial protection functions currently held by: 1) the Board of Governors [of
the Federal Reserve]; 2) the Comptroller of Currency; 3) the Director of the
Office of Thrift Supervision; 4) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; 5)
97. Evans & Wright, supra note 96, at 35.
98. Id. at 3.
99. David S. Evans & Joshua D. Wright, A Response to Professor Levitin on the Effect of the
Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009 on Consumer Credit 4 (Geo. Mason Univ.
Law & Econ., Research Paper Ser. 09-56, Nov. 4, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1499261.
100. See id.
101. Stephanie Condon, Obama: Financial Reform Deal Has 90 Percent of What I Proposed,
CBS NEWS (June 25, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20008823-503544.html.
102. See discussion infra Part III (discussing the economic impact of the Dodd-Frank Act).
103. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1011(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010).
104. Id.
105. Id. § 1011(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 1964.
106. Id. § 1011(c)(1), (3), 124 Stat. at 1964.
107. Id. § 1011(d), 124 Stat. at 1964.
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the Federal Trade Commission’s functions under the enumerated consumer
protection laws; 6) the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA); and 7)
the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) relating to the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, the Secure and Fair Enforcement for
Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008, and the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure
Act.108 The duties transferred to the BCFP include “all authority to prescribe
rules or issue orders or guidelines pursuant to any Federal consumer financial
law, including performing appropriate functions to promulgate and review
Additionally, the BCFP may
such rules, orders, and guidelines.”109
“implement[] the Federal consumer financial laws through rules, orders,
guidance, interpretations, statements of policy, examinations, and enforcement
actions.”110
The Dodd-Frank Act also makes it unlawful for any covered person “to
offer or provide to a consumer any financial product or service not in
conformity with Federal consumer financial law, or otherwise commit any act
or omission in violation of a Federal consumer financial law; or to engage in
any unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice.”111 Consumer financial
products or services include “any financial product or service that is
described . . . under [the Act]” and “(A) . . . is offered or provided for use by
consumers primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; or (B) . . . is
delivered, offered, or provided in connection with a consumer financial
product or service.”112
The BCFP is further provided with authority to take action “to prevent a
covered person or service provider from committing or engaging in an unfair,

108. Dodd-Frank Act § 1061(b), 124 Stat. at 2036.
109. Id. § 1061(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 2036.
110. Id. § 1012(a)(10), 124 Stat. at 1965.
111. Id. § 1036(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 2010.
112. Id. §§ 1002(5), (15)(A), 124 Stat. at 1957–60. “Financial product or service” is defined
in the Dodd-Frank Act to mean: 1) extending credit and servicing loans; 2) “extending or
brokering leases of personal or real property”; 3) providing real estate settlement services; 4)
“engaging in deposit-taking activities, transmitting or exchanging funds”; 5) “selling, providing,
or issuing stored value or payment instruments”; 6) “providing check cashing, check collection,
or check guaranty services”; 7) “providing payments or other financial data processing products
or services to a consumer by any technological means”; 8) “providing financial advisory services
. . . to consumers on individual financial matters”; 9) “collecting, analyzing, maintaining, or
providing consumer report information or other account information”; 10) “collecting debt related
to any consumer financial product or service”; and 11) “such other financial product or service as
may be defined by the [BCFP], by regulation, for purposes of [Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act], if
the Bureau finds that such financial product or service . . . is entered into or conducted as a
subterfuge or with a purpose to evade any Federal consumer financial law; or permissible for a
bank or for a financial holding company to offer or to provide under any provision of a Federal
law or regulation applicable to a bank or a financial holding company, and has, or likely will
have, a material impact on consumers.” Id. § 1002(15), 124 Stat. at 1958–60.
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deceptive, or abusive act or practice under Federal law in connection with any
transaction with a consumer for a consumer financial product or service, or the
offering of a consumer financial product or service.”113 The BCFP, however,
is not given authority to declare acts or practices unfair “unless the Bureau has
a reasonable basis to conclude that . . . the act or practice causes or is likely to
cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers; and . . . such substantial injury is not outweighed by countervailing
benefits to consumers or to competition.”114
The BCFP has various tools to prevent unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts,
including assessing civil monetary penalties, instituting adjudicatory hearings,
or even commencing civil lawsuits.115 The Bureau may “conduct hearings and
adjudication proceedings . . . in order to ensure or enforce compliance with the
provisions of [Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act] . . .; and any other federal law
that the [BCFP] is authorized to enforce, including an enumerated consumer
law” or regulations promulgated under those acts.116
Additionally, the BCFP may commence a civil action “to impose a civil
penalty or to seek all appropriate legal and equitable relief including a
permanent or temporary injunction as permitted by law” for violations of a
federal consumer financial law.117 Federal consumer financial law includes
“the provisions of [Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act], the enumerated consumer
laws, the laws for which authorities are transferred [to the BCFP], and any rule
or order prescribed by the [BCFP].”118 The enumerated consumer laws include
the following: the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982; the
Consumer Leasing Act of 1976; the Electronic Fund Transfer Act; the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act; the Fair Credit Billing Act; the Fair Credit Reporting
Act; the Homeowners Protection Act of 1998; the Fair Debt Collection

113. Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(a), 124 Stat. at 2005. A “covered person” within the meaning of
the Dodd-Frank Act means “any person that engages in offering or providing a consumer
financial product or service; and any affiliate of [that] person . . . if such affiliate acts as a service
provider to such person.” Id. § 1002(6), 124 Stat. at 1956. A “person” means an “individual,
partnership, company, corporation, association (incorporated or unincorporated), trust, estate,
cooperative organization, or other entity.” Id. § 1002(19), 124 Stat. at 1961. A “service
provider” within the Dodd-Frank Act means “any person that provides a material service to a
covered person in connection with the offering or provision by such covered person of a
consumer financial product or service . . . that participates in designing, operating, or maintaining
the consumer financial product or service; or processes transactions relating to the consumer
financial product or service . . . .” Id. § 1002(26), 124 Stat. 1562–63.
114. Id. § 1031(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 2006.
115. See generally id. §§ 1051–1058, 124 Stat. at 2018–35 (outlining the authority of the
Commission to make and enforce rules using fines, an administrative hearing process, and civil
litigation).
116. Id. § 1053(a), 124 Stat. at 2025.
117. Id. § 1054(a), 124 Stat. at 2028.
118. Dodd-Frank Act § 1002(14), 124 Stat. at 1957.
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Practices Act; Subsections (b) through (f) of section 43 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act; Sections 502 through 509 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act; the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975; the Home Ownership and Equity
Protection Act of 1994; the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act; the
S.A.F.E. Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008; the Truth in Lending Act; the Truth
in Savings Act; Section 626 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009; and the
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act.119
The court in a proceeding brought under federal consumer financial law is
given jurisdiction to grant any appropriate legal or equitable remedies.120 Such
relief may include “rescission or reformation of contracts; refund of moneys or
return of real property; restitution; disgorgement or compensation for unjust
enrichment; payment of damages or other monetary relief; public notification
regarding the violation, including costs of notification; limits on the activities
or functions of the person; and civil money penalties.”121 The courts, however,
are not authorized to impose exemplary or punitive damages.122
The civil monetary penalties the BCFP or the courts may assess are
divided into three tiers.123 Tier one imposes a penalty not to exceed $5,000, for
each day a “violation of a law, rule, or final order or condition imposed in
writing by the Bureau.”124 The second tier imposes a penalty not to exceed
$25,000, for reckless violations of any federal consumer financial law.125 Tier
three imposes a civil penalty up to $1,000,000 per day, for knowingly violating
a federal consumer financial law.126
III. EFFECT OF THE BCFP ON CONSUMERS
The proposal to create the CFPA, and by extension the creation of the
BCFP, has been praised by some while criticized by others. Critics argue this
new bureau will do nothing but limit the credit available to consumers and
raise the costs of obtaining that credit.127 Credit is vitally important to the
economy of the United States. Consumers need credit to provide liquidity
when cash is unavailable and to spread the cost of large purchases such as
homes, vehicles, and educations over time.128 Credit drives a substantial

119. Id. § 1002(12), 124 Stat. at 1957.
120. Id. § 1055(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 1957.
121. Id. § 1055(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 2030.
122. Id. § 1055(a)(3), 124 Stat. at 2030.
123. Dodd-Frank Act § 1055(c), 124 Stat. at 2030.
124. Id. § 1055(c)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 2030.
125. Id. § 1055(c)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 2030.
126. Id. § 1055(c)(2)(C), 124 Stat. at 2030.
127. See, e.g., Evans & Wright, supra note 96, at 3.
128. Id. at 6–7. As noted previously, the BCFP was developed as an alternative to the CFPA.
The BCFP, however, will function in a manner substantially similar to how the CFPA would have
operated. As a result, the effect of the BCFP on consumer lending will be the same as the
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portion of consumer spending, which is the lifeblood of the economy.129 For
the most part, consumers are responsible in their use of credit, and its
availability allows consumers to increase their standard of living.130 There are
some consumers, though, who do not responsibly use credit, taking on large
amounts of debt they are unable to repay.131 It is for this reason that extending
credit is a risky business for lenders who are uncertain whether the consumers
will be able to repay the principal of the loan.132
Due to the importance of credit to the economy and the risks associated
with extending credit, it is important to ensure the availability of credit while
providing regulation to ensure credit is dispensed in a responsible manner.
Some economists argue that “stronger consumer protection regulation could
make these consumers better off by regulating the design of these products,
mandating various disclosures, restricting consumer choice, and ‘nudging’
consumer toward certain standardized financial products.”133 On the other
hand, ill-considered consumer protections “could reverse the increase in the
availability and democratization of credit that consumers have benefited from
over the last thirty years.”134
Some critics, including Professors David Evans and Joshua Wright, argue
that the reforms offered by the Dodd-Frank Act fall into the latter category of
ill-considered consumer protections that would limit the availability of
consumer credit.135 They contend that the BCFP is likely to create a
bureaucratic and legal disaster.136 Other critics argue the reforms offered by
the BCFP are duplicative of existing consumer protections and will dampen the
availability of credit to consumers.137 The BCFP, according to Evans and
Wright, will also significantly increase the cost of providing credit to
consumers.138 Lenders will encounter significant uncertainty about the
requirements of the BCFP and regulations promulgated by the BCFP.139
Sorting out these requirements will require countless hours of research and
significant expenditures for legal advice. Additionally, lenders may face an
projected effect of the CFPA. Compare Dodd-Frank Act §§ 1001–1100H, 124 Stat. at 1367–
2113, with Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. §§
10051–10302 (2009) (as passed by the House of Representatives on Dec.11, 2009).
129. Evans & Wright, supra note 96, at 48.
130. Id. at 8–9.
131. Id. at 8.
132. Id. at 9.
133. Id. at 29.
134. Evans & Wright, supra note 96, at 43.
135. See, e.g., id. at 43 (listing the ways in which the CFPA will limit consumer access to
credit).
136. Id. at 37–38.
137. Interview with Thomas W. Hough, supra note 96.
138. Evans & Wright, supra note 96, at 39–40.
139. Id. at 37–38.
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onslaught of litigation or the assessment of penalties.140 Courts also will be
faced with the difficult task of defining unfair, deceptive, and abusive
practices.141 Loans will require additional paperwork, and new products will
be subjected to an expensive and comprehensive review process.142 The
lenders will seek compensation for these additional requirements and will
likely pass the costs of compliance onto consumers, raising the cost of
obtaining credit.143
In addition to additional costs associated with obtaining credit, consumers
are likely to have more difficulty obtaining credit under the BCFP. Customers
whose credit scores and circumstances place them on the borderline of a
particular bank’s lending requirements are likely to find a reduction in
available loans under the BCFP.144 The reason is that bankers will deem these
borderline loans too risky and decline to extend them for fear of facing fines or
litigation.145 Furthermore, the BCFP, using its authority to ban products it
deems unfair or deceptive, may prevent certain innovative products from being
offered.146 Determining that a product is unfair or deceptive in the abstract
fails to account for consumers making logical choices to accept the risk of a
product to achieve particular end goals.147 Thus, the BCFP will limit consumer
autonomy and choice by limiting the availability of innovative consumer
financial products.148
IV. CURRENT CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS AVAILABLE TO SUBPRIME
BORROWERS
The BCFP’s benefits do not outweigh its risks, and given the likely effect
that it will have on lending, it is unnecessary. The BCFP is unnecessary
because individuals wronged by predatory lenders already have a mechanism
for redressing their injuries through civil actions that the Dodd-Frank Act tasks
140. Id.
141. Id. at 37.
142. Id. at 38.
143. Evans & Wright, supra note 96, at 39–40. For an estimate of the cost increase caused by
passage of the BCFP, see id. at 43–47.
144. Interview with Thomas W. Hough, supra note 96.
145. Id.
146. Evans & Wright, supra note 96, at 36.
147. Id. at 41. Judge Richard Posner argues this is what happened during the subprime
mortgage crisis. Richard A. Posner, Op-Ed., Treating Financial Consumers as Consenting
Adults, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2009, at A15. According to Judge Posner, “It cannot just be
assumed that most people who during the housing boom bought homes with adjustable-rate
mortgages, or mortgages with prepayment penalties, or mortgages that required a low or even no
down payment, were fools or victims of fraud.” Id. At the time these loans were made, the
government denied that the rapid increase in home prices was a bubble and interest rates were
low, and for that reason, many Americans chose—logically—to borrow. Id.
148. Evans & Wright, supra note 96, at 43.
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the BCFP with enforcing.149 This Comment does not take the position that
consumers do not need protection or that the current state of the law provides
sufficient protection. Instead, this Comment considers whether the new
government bureau will actually improve protection of consumers injured by
predatory or less than forthcoming lenders.
As mentioned above, the Dodd-Frank Act enumerates several federal laws
and provides the BCFP with authority to pursue civil lawsuits for violations of
those laws.150 Several of these enumerated laws, however, already allow
individuals to pursue civil suits for violations of those statutes.151 Therefore,
the BCFP simply creates a duplicative right of redress.
Currently, a subprime borrower who feels he has been misled by a lender
or has been the victim of predatory lending can seek redress through the court
system. In fact, the subprime mortgage meltdown has spawned a wave of
litigation under laws already in force.152 These plaintiffs have numerous
possible causes of action, including those based upon violations of the federal
statutes enumerated in the Dodd-Frank Act—specifically, TILA and
RESPA.153 In addition, consumers have the ability to combine these claims

149. Another reason the BCFP is unnecessary is that the current regulatory structure of the
United States, specifically the Federal Trade Commission, with a few modifications is fully
capable of regulating financial products and services to prevent a future collapse of the financial
market as was experienced during 2007–2008. However, Jon Leibowitz, Chairman of the Federal
Trade Commission, when testifying before Congress explained, “Many of the rulemaking,
enforcement, education, and research functions of the [BCFP] are functions that the FTC
currently performs with respect to entities under its jurisdiction.” Proposed Consumer Financial
Protection Agency: Implications for Consumers and the Federal Trade Commission Before the H.
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, & Consumer Protection, 111th
Cong. 15 (2009) (statement of Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n), available at
www.ftc.gov/os/2009/07/090708Acfpatestimony.pdf. The FTC Act prohibits unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce except for banks, savings and loan institutions, and
certain credit unions, which are exempted from regulation by the FTC. Id. at 2. If Congress’s
goal in creating the BCFP was to provide one agency with the responsibility for regulating
consumer financial products, Congress could have simply removed the banking exemptions from
the FTC act allowing the FTC to regulate all consumer financial products, rather than creating an
entirely new bureau.
150. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 §§ 1002(12), 1002(14), 1054(a), 124 Stat. 1376,
1957, 2028 (2010).
151. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1640(a), 2605(f), 2607(d)(5) (2006).
152. See Brian E. Robison, Litigation in the Wake of the Subprime Lending Collapse: What
Has Happened and Where We Are, 14 No. 4 ANDREWS DERIVATIVES LITIG. REP. 22 (Jan. 7,
2008) (detailing the numerous types of actions that have resulted from the subprime crisis);
Schmudde, supra note 44, at 63 (providing a similar list of lawsuits brought due to the subprime
lending crisis).
153. Allison Torres Burtka, Predatory-Lending Litigation Looms, TRIAL, May 2008, at 16,
16; Arielle L. Katzman, Note, A Round Peg for a Square Hole: The Mismatch Between Subprime
Borrowers and Federal Mortgage Remedies, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 497, 498 (2009).
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with others based on state consumer protection acts and state common law
fraud, which are beyond the purview of the BCFP.154
Since the beginning of 2007, 866 subprime mortgage-related cases have
been filed in federal court—290 in 2007 and 576 in 2008.155 Twenty-four
percent of the suits filed in 2008 were borrower class actions.156 In 2007,
borrower class actions accounted for 43% of subprime-related litigation.157
These suits have been filed against mortgage brokers, lenders, appraisers, title
companies, and numerous other players in the mortgage origination and
securitization market.158 Twenty-eight percent of these class actions alleged
inadequate disclosures, and 12% alleged discriminatory lending practices in
2007 and 2008.159 However, the most common claims found in these borrower
class actions involve improper charges or payments made during the loan
origination process.160
It has been argued that the current federal consumer protection statutes
were not developed for the subprime market and that the redress available
under these statutes does not provide adequate protection for consumers
because subprime mortgages are complex transactions.161 Even if all the
required disclosures regarding the terms and costs of the loans are presented to
the borrowers, the borrowers lack the wherewithal and skill necessary to
properly evaluate the loan and make an informed decision about whether they
can or cannot afford the loan.162 This portion of the Comment will briefly
explain the requirements of TILA, including the HOEPA amendments and
RESPA, as well as the provisions in these acts that allow consumers to bring
private lawsuits for their violations. It will then consider the shortfalls of these
statutes in the subprime-lending context.
A.

The Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA)

TILA, passed in 1968, is a consumer credit law intended to protect
consumers by requiring lenders to make certain disclosures in credit
transactions.163 TILA mandates that mortgage lenders disclose certain
information, including the amount financed, the finance charge represented as

154. Katzman, supra note 153, at 539–40.
155. JEFF NIELSON ET AL., NAVIGANT CONSULTING, SUBPRIME MORTGAGE AND RELATED
LITIGATION 2008: SEEKING RELIEF 4 (2009).
156. Id.
157. JEFF NIELSON ET AL., NAVIGANT CONSULTING, SUBPRIME MORTGAGE AND RELATED
LITIGATION 2007: LOOKING BACK AT WHAT’S AHEAD 2 (2007).
158. NIELSON ET AL., supra note 155, at 5.
159. Id. at 10.
160. Id.
161. Katzman, supra note 153, at 511.
162. Id. at 509–10.
163. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006).
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an annual percentage rate (APR), and the number and amount of payments
required to repay the loan before the credit is actually extended.164 The
purpose of TILA is to ensure that borrowers have all the necessary information
to calculate the true cost of the loan and to enable borrowers to compare loans
across lenders.165 TILA also imposes limits on the interest rate that can be
charged on mortgages.166
If a creditor fails to satisfy the requirements of TILA or Regulation Z (the
Federal Reserve’s guideline for complying with TILA), the borrower may
bring a civil action, which may take the form of a class action lawsuit.167
Borrowers who bring successful TILA claims are entitled to receive actual
damages, statutory damages of up to $4,000, reasonable costs of bringing the
action, and reasonable attorney’s fees.168 In order to recover actual damages,
courts require the borrowers to establish that the TILA violation was the
proximate cause of the actual damages.169 This requires the plaintiff to
establish that: “(1) he read the TILA disclosure statement; (2) he understood
the charges being disclosed; (3) had the disclosure statement been accurate, he
would have sought a lower price; and (4) he would have obtained a lower
price.”170
Additionally, in certain circumstances, borrowers are able to rescind the
loan for TILA violations.171 Within three business days of the consummation
of the loan or the delivery of proper TILA disclosures, whichever is later, the
borrower can rescind a loan for any reason.172 If the borrower can prove “[he
or she] received inaccurate material disclosures, [was] not provided material
disclosures, or [was] not notified of the right to rescind,”173 the borrower can
rescind the loan for a period of three years.174 Unfortunately, the right of
rescission does not currently apply to residential mortgage transactions.175
On its face, TILA appears to have substantial power to protect consumers
and ensure they know what they are getting themselves into when entering a
164. Id. § 1638(a).
165. See id. § 1601(a).
166. 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(3) (2010). These limits were such that they failed to prevent the
rates charged on subprime mortgages. Schmudde, supra note 44, at 49.
167. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a); Richard J. Link, Annotation, Civil Remedies for Violations of
Credit Transactions Provisions of Truth In Lending Act (TILA) (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601 et seq.), as
Amended by Truth In Lending Simplification and Reform Act of 1982, 113 A.L.R. FED. 173, 185–
86 (1993).
168. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a).
169. Peters v. Jim Lupient Oldsmobile Co., 220 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 2000).
170. Id.
171. 15 U.S.C. § 1635.
172. Id. § 1635(a); Katzman, supra note 153, at 529.
173. Katzman, supra note 153, at 529.
174. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a), (f).
175. Id. § 1635(e)(1).
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loan. TILA, though, has several shortcomings. TILA disclosures provided to
borrowers, especially in the context of subprime or adjustable rate mortgages,
are so complex they cannot be understood without great explanation.176
Additionally, TILA only applies to creditors, but oftentimes, especially with
subprime borrowers, mortgage brokers who do not meet the definition of
creditors nevertheless handle the loan origination and communicate directly
with the client.177 The statutory damages provided by TILA, meant to provide
incentives for private enforcement, actually provide only “meager damages,”
allowed only if a borrower can satisfy statutory requirements designed for
prime borrowers.178 Proving actual damages under TILA is also problematic
for subprime borrowers. The second prong, which requires the borrower to
prove that he understood the charges being discussed in the disclosures,
undermines the argument that the layperson borrower was unable to
understand the disclosures.179 The third and fourth prongs fail to account for
the fact that subprime borrowers, because of their low credit scores, have fewer
options available for financing.180
The fact-sensitive inquiry required to recover actual damages also provides
a substantial barrier for proceeding with class action suits.181 The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure require a prospective class to establish, among other
things, that there are matters of law and fact common to the class before the
court can certify a class.182 By requiring plaintiffs to establish the facts
surrounding the disclosures, the understanding of the disclosures, and reliance
on the disclosures, it will be extremely difficult for a court to find a
commonality of facts sufficient to certify a class.183 Additionally, as
mentioned above, the right of rescission provided by TILA does not apply to
residential mortgage transactions, effectively barring subprime borrowers from
using the most beneficial provision of TILA to obtain relief.184 As a result of
these shortcomings, Congress determined that additional legislation was
necessary and passed the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act.185
176. Schmudde, supra note 44, at 49–50.
177. Katzman, supra note 153, at 524–25.
178. Id. at 527. The statutory damages are bonus damages for the plaintiff meant to
encourage private enforcement as well as to punish and deter defendants from taking the
prohibited action in the future. Dryden v. Lou Budke’s Arrow Fin. Co., 630 F.2d 641, 647 (8th
Cir. 1980).
179. Katzman, supra note 153, at 528.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 528–29.
182. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
183. Katzman, supra note 153, at 528–29.
184. Id. at 530.
185. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement (Home Ownership and
Equity Protection) Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
1601–1649).
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Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA)

The HOEPA amended TILA in 1994 to cover first-lien loans and require
additional safeguards on high-cost loans.186 HOEPA mandates additional
disclosure requirements, including full disclosure of interest rates and written
notice of fees and costs three days prior to closing.187 HOEPA bans specific
types of terms and practices like prepayment penalties, balloon payments, and
calling loans prior to their due date.188 Furthermore, HOEPA requires lenders
to take into consideration the borrower’s ability to repay the loan before
extending credit and provides regulatory authority to the Federal Reserve.189
HOEPA also provides causes of actions for consumers to pursue against
lenders.190
The HOEPA requirements, while containing many useful parts and much
needed regulatory authority, have failed to provide sufficient protection for
subprime borrowers because the requirements do not apply to residential
mortgage transactions.191 Additionally, despite its ability to regulate under
HOEPA, the Federal Reserve did not pass any regulations until 2008, after the
subprime mortgage crisis began.192
C. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA)
RESPA was enacted in 1974, six years after TILA, to help consumers shop
for settlement services and to eliminate kickbacks and referral fees that
increased the cost of settlement services.193 RESPA requires certain disclosure
requirements for the lender in residential transactions. “These disclosures
include: A special information booklet; a good faith estimate of charges; actual
settlement costs; escrow payments scheduled for the first year of the
mortgage.”194 Lenders must disclose any ownership interest they have in
businesses that they recommend to consumers as well.195 Additionally,
RESPA requires the lender to notify the buyer whether the lender plans to

186. Katzman, supra note 153, at 508; Schmudde, supra note 44, at 50. It is important to note
that HOEPA does not apply to home purchase loans, but rather loans secured by the borrower’s
primary residence. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1) (2006).
187. Id. § 1639(a)–(b).
188. Id. § 1639(c), (e); Schmudde, supra note 44, at 50.
189. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(h), (l). See also Katzman, supra note 153, at 508; Schmudde, supra
note 44, at 50.
190. 15 U.S.C. § 1640. See also Katzman, supra note 153, at 523.
191. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1). See also Katzman, supra note 153, at 523–24.
192. Schmudde, supra note 44, at 50.
193. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2006)).
194. Schmudde, supra note 44, at 50. See also 12 U.S.C. §§ 2603–2606.
195. 12 U.S.C. § 2607; 25 C.F.R. § 3500.15 (2010).
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service the loan in house or transfer it to another lender, and to notify the
borrower if the loan is sold or assigned.196
RESPA enables borrowers to bring civil actions for monetary damages
based on kickbacks and unearned fees, servicing violations, and seller-required
title insurance.197 If a buyer is able to show that referring parties provided
kickbacks or split settlement fees with one another, the borrower can hold the
parties jointly and severally liable for three times the amount of any charge
paid for settlement services, along with court costs and attorney’s fees.198
Some have argued that RESPA fails to provide relief for many subprime
borrowers because RESPA was meant to regulate the process of closing a loan,
not the substantive terms of the loan.199 Others have argued that RESPA cost
estimates are inaccurate and difficult for inexperienced borrowers to
understand.200 Also, despite the treble damage provision, it has been argued
that successful suits under RESPA will result in only small recoveries that do
not justify the cost of bringing the action.201 Furthermore, RESPA does not
allow for rescission, which limits its effectiveness in helping consumers.202
V. EVALUATION OF THE BCFP AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONGRESSIONAL
ACTION
Given the weaknesses of the current laws and the vast expanse of the crisis
caused by subprime mortgages, it is understandable that members of Congress
and the Obama Administration, as part of their financial reform package,
created a new “agency” to promulgate rules and regulations, pursue civil
lawsuits, and assess civil monetary penalties. People are angry and feel that
“Main Street,” acting through its representatives in Washington, D.C., should
push back and punish those on “Wall Street” who caused the collapse.203
While this sentiment is shared by many, and understandably so, the BCFP is
not the solution to the subprime problem.
TILA, HOEPA, and RESPA are federal statutes which currently provide
redress for injured borrowers. These acts also are included in the Dodd-Frank
Act’s enumerated consumer laws under which the BCFP can institute civil

196. 12 U.S.C. § 2605.
197. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(f), 2607(d)(1).
198. Id. § 2607(d)(2), (5). See Katzman, supra note 153, at 513 n.100 (describing a conflict
among courts regarding the application of the treble damage provisions).
199. Katzman, supra note 153, at 512.
200. Schmudde, supra note 44, at 50.
201. Katzman, supra note 153, at 513.
202. Id. at 512.
203. See Ron Resnick, Another View: Why No Restrictions on Leverage?, DEALBOOK (July
19, 2010, 9:30 AM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/19/another-view-why-norestrictions-on-leverage/.
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lawsuits.204 However, as discussed above, each of these acts has inherent
weaknesses, which prevent subprime borrowers from obtaining complete
relief. A bureau of the federal government bringing the lawsuit, rather than an
individual plaintiff or group of plaintiffs, will not rectify these weaknesses.
Just as it is difficult for a consumer bringing a TILA action to establish that he
understood the disclosures, it will be difficult for the BCFP to establish that the
borrower read and understood the disclosures. Throughout the past four
decades since TILA was enacted, Congress, in an effort to improve loan
disclosure to consumers, has passed several additional bills increasing the
number of disclosures provided to buyers.205 This layering of legislation on
top of legislation has resulted in borrowers being bombarded with documents
at closing which make the task of understanding the terms of the loan arduous
and time-consuming—effectively negating the consumer’s ability to truly
understand the loan.206 This new bureau, with power to prescribe additional
disclosures, will not solve this problem; in fact it will compound the problem.
Additionally, allowing a governmental agency to bring a lawsuit will not
change the fact that TILA’s rescission provisions do not apply to residential
mortgage transactions. Nor will it allow the provisions of HOEPA to apply to
residential mortgage transactions.
Therefore, rather than creating the BCFP, Congress and the Obama
Administration should have thoroughly reviewed the existing federal consumer
protection laws and focused on improving the remedies already available to
subprime consumers under those acts. Borrowers would be better served by
amending TILA, HOEPA, and RESPA to require simpler disclosures and
better communication of the most essential terms of the loan, including
principal amount, interest rate, repayment terms, and fees. Perhaps disclosures
could be accompanied by a letter stating, in simple terms, the following: “You
are borrowing _____ dollars, at an interest rate of _____%. The loan will be
repaid by payment of _____ dollars each month for _____ consecutive months.
Over the lifetime of the loan you will be paying _____ dollars, total.”207 If the
loan has an adjustable rate, additional language should be added, denoting that
the “APR is subject to increase to a maximum rate of _____%”; explaining
when the APR can be increased; and providing a series of calculations

204. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1002(12), 1053(a), 1054(a), 124 Stat. 1957,
2025, 2028 (2010).
205. Interview with Thomas W. Hough, supra note 96.
206. Id.
207. Much of this information is currently required to be disclosed under 12 C.F.R. §§
226.5(a), 226.6 (2009). Section 226.5 requires creditors to make TILA disclosures “clearly and
conspicuously in writing, in a form that the consumer may keep.” Id. § 226.5. However, it would
be beneficial to mandate that this disclosure be in the form of a letter using the simple language
above because different lenders may understand “clearly and conspicuously” differently.
Mandating this language would help consumers compare loan options quickly and easily.
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denoting the amount of monthly payments and total amount paid based upon
the maximum interest rate.208
Additionally, Congress should consider requiring the lender to walk
through the terms of the loan with the consumer, advising them to seek outside
counsel if they do not understand the provisions of their prospective loan.
Another recommendation proposed by scholars is to require some form of
credit counseling for borrowers before they can obtain a mortgage loan, similar
to that required before filing for bankruptcy.209 These changes would provide
a great deal more protection than simply allowing a new government agency to
bring the same flawed causes of action consumers can already bring
themselves.
However, even if Congress determined that amending TILA, HOEPA, and
RESPA did not go far enough, there are still steps that Congress could have
taken short of creating a new bureau to aid in protecting consumers. Congress
could have passed new legislation to provide these protections. In the DoddFrank Act, the BCFP is provided with the authority to take action “to prevent a
covered person or service provider from committing or engaging in an unfair,
deceptive, or abusive act or practice under Federal law in connection with any
transaction with a consumer for a consumer financial product or service, or the
offering of a consumer financial product or service.”210 Banning unfair,
deceptive, and abusive practices is a reasonable step toward preventing the
abuses that gave rise to the financial crisis. However, instead of using the
BCFP as the mechanism for preventing such practices, Congress should have
simply banned those acts and practices and provided a private right of action
for individual victims. The private right of action could have provided for
actual damages, substantial statutory damages, treble damages, and even
rescission or reformation of the mortgage agreement. Instead of providing that
the bureau has the power to assess civil monetary penalties, the legislation
could have provided for punitive or exemplary damages for egregious
violations. Allowing a private right of action with the possibility of punitive
damages would have adequately served the purposes the BCFP is meant to
serve—protection of consumers and deterrence of predatory behavior—
without most of the negatives associated with the BCFP.
Another complication of the BCFP is the cost of administering the bureau.
As detailed above, the new bureau will likely increase the costs of making

208. Mr. Hough mentioned that these requirements would help improve standard prime
transactions. However, with the complexity that often accompanies subprime mortgages, simple
disclosures like those described above may not be possible. Interview with Thomas W. Hough,
supra note 96.
209. ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION 123–28 (2008).
210. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1031(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2005 (2010).
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loans to banks and other mortgage lenders.211 This will have a significant
impact on the number of loans made and the interest rates charged on those
loans.212 The decrease in loans and increase in interest rates will in turn have
significantly impact home ownership. However, if Congress, instead of
creating the BCFP, passed a statute banning unfair or deceptive practices and
allowed a private right of action, the costs of making loans would only increase
for those lenders using unfair or deceptive practices, and only those lenders
would have to recoup the additional costs through increased fees or interest
rates. This would make loans from these lenders less attractive than other
lenders—achieving a deterrent effect and preventing deceptive loans from
being made. Those lenders who make proper disclosures and operate legally
and ethically would be able to continue those practices free from an increased
regulatory burden. All lenders did not cause the financial crisis, so the focus of
Congressional action should have been on those that did cause the crisis.
CONCLUSION
The Great Recession has been difficult for everyone. The federal
government chose to bail out numerous failing financial institutions that made
loans without regard for the risks associated with them. Many people, both
prime and subprime borrowers, have lost their homes to foreclosure. Countless
more have found themselves behind on mortgages and owing more on their
home than it is worth. This is a tragic situation, and steps should be taken to
prevent a similar crisis from occurring in the future. However, the BCFP is not
the solution consumers need. The protections offered by the BCFP are
duplicative of previous consumer protections and will likely result in credit
being scarcer and more expensive.
Instead of creating the BCFP, Congress should have reviewed the existing
consumer protection laws and passed amendments or further legislation
allowing subprime borrowers who were the victims of predatory lenders to
obtain sufficient remedies on their own through civil litigation. The
amendments or new causes of action should have punished dishonest, deceitful
lenders by providing punitive damages for egregious breaches and allowing
rescission of unfair and abusive contracts. Congress should also have
simplified disclosures and perhaps mandated credit counseling for consumers
before they obtain mortgage loans. Those changes would have fulfilled the

211. Evans & Wright, supra note 96, at 39–40.
212. Id. Modifying current federal consumer protection laws or passing a new consumer
protection law would likely still require lenders to incur additional costs to determine if their
practices are unfair or deceptive. Additionally, courts would still be required to decipher the
meaning of those terms. However, these costs would likely be less than those associated with
creating an entirely new government bureau.
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goals of the BCFP without creating the bureaucratic and legal quagmire that
comes with it.
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